Re: Complexity, languaging and design LO516

Fred Reed (freed@cc.atinc.com)
Wed, 22 Mar 95 15:52:00 EST

Recently, Mike McMaster wrote in LO480:

(begin quote)

Fred says, "languaging is still a material based act (ie. acoustic waves
as sounds, etc.) just as a chemical might function as a transmitter in the
nervous or immune system of even the simplest animal." The nature of
languaging and, its related area, listening are far from material in any
important sense if we are interested in uderstanding and meaning. If we
are interested in mere functioning, then the material plays an obvious
part. The distinction here is important. The fact of "material" being
involved doesn't make a phenomenon material. As far as I know, there is
no phenomenon that is solely "material" - except possibly the emergent
ones which emerge (at least partially) _from_ the material. (end quote)

I fully agree with what Mike says about understanding and meaning. My
rather crude remark about language being material was meant to tease from
Mike the distinction he made some time ago between two different levels of
complex systems. He last two (most complex) levels were:

(deleting stuff about first two levels, and intro to third)
(begin quote)
>purposes, has been created from what SFI and others have developed
>beginning from living systems - systems whose defining way of
functioning
>is adaptation, learning and innovation. These include evolution,
immune
>systems, cognitive research, species, societies and human learning.
>
>- the fourth is one which I'm developing that is intelligent systems
>(complex becomes redundant and unwieldy at this stage). These systems
are
>those which emerge from the interaction of language based entities and
>co-evolve with those entities. My particular interest is a new theory
of
>organisation that will enable our aspirations and possibilities by
taking
>into account the intelligent possibility of a language based system.
(end quote)

I (perhaps mistakenly) took the difference between these two layers as
being based on the "type" of interaction between the entities so self-
organizing. In particular, the fourth level is "language-based", so I
assumed that the third level was, inferring from the examples given such
as immune systems and species, somehow distinguished by a more material
(vs. language) basis for structural coupling (to use the autopoiesis
term)>

My problem/question still is: I don't see a reason to distinguish
"language-based" emergent systems from those of level three, that also,
in my mind, use the same semiotic (i.e., sign using) process for their
self-organization. Admittedly, there are quantum levels of semiosis that
certain less complex systems are presently limited to, whereas human
language is capable of the highest levels of semiosis. However, human
learning (nervous system presumably), mentioned as an example of third-
level complexity is certainly as semiotically complex. That is, the
catagories of signs used in human thought and action are of the same type
available within human discourse. The signs themselves seem to be more
material in immune and nervous systems, but as for their meaningfullness
(capacity for), they are equally as capable as the printed or spoken
word.

I guess my whole point behind this is that Mike said he was developing "a
new theory of organization" for the fourth level system, and I'm wondering
why an appropriate theory of organization for his third level might not
also apply to the fourth.

Fred Reed
freed@cc.atinc.com