>
> >Two decades ago, while reading Pirsig's Zen and the Art of Motorcycle
> >Maintenance, I happened on his passage discussing "quality" as being the
> >name for the edge of which you speak. <deleted>
> >His edge was the place where you meet the environment BEFORE you assign
> >value oto the signals you are receiving. That's a pure place, untainted
> >by the values, attitudes, beliefs, prejudices, and KNOWLEDGE you might
> >couple to the signals. <more deleted>
>
> What I am proposing is that (somewhat contradictory to Weherenberg's
> interpretation of Pirsig) *values* are the pre-conscious "selectors" by
> which individuals come to perceive their own reality. Now I understand
> that the meaning of "values" has been spread pretty thin lately by
> politicians and op-ed writers, but in fact there is a fairly rigorous body
> of research concerning "value", also known as "axiology". A significant
> part of this research is directed at answering Andrew Moreno's question.
> I will try to summarize:
Au contraire! I couldn't agree more. I think Pirsig's point (and mine,
for sure) is that it is UNFORTUNATE that values are pre-conscious
selection criteria. If experience can be likened to an edge cutting
through the envionment, true perception (pre-conscious) lies at a point
just ahead of the edge ... as soon as values (such as those you posit
below) are applied, some of the original is lost ... filtered. I think
that's what the altered-state business is in quest of ... the point
before values are applied. Surely, in a religious sense, that seems to
conform to my limited understanding of the meditative "actualization"
religions. I must add, that I think the same might apply to drug-altered
realities (no personal knowledge here), and to the trek taken by Carlos
Casteneda under the tutelage of Don Juan (metaphorical, I assume).
Regarding your three deminisions of value, below, I am having trouble
seening the important distinction between systematic and extrinsic.
Aren't both judging against an existing, measurable standard? Ought
seems to be a comparison with a standard of oughtness, and extrinsic
seems to measure against a set of class standards. Hep me, hep me ...
>
> There are three dimensions of value:
>
> 1. Systemic: judging how "things" conform to formal systems or "law". For
> example, when one says something "ought" to be, it presumes a system or
> law that provides the basis for "ought". (e.g., A beer of this style
> *ought* to be darker*) The result of systemic value is often judging
> acceptable/unacceptable.
>
> 2. Extrinsic: judging how things measure up to the characteristics of
> generic classes. For example, this is a "good" chair because it has
> characteristics similar to those of a generic class of things called
> chairs (it doesn't fall over easily, it has a padded seat, etc.
> Extrinstic result is carried to its extreme by "conniseurs."
>
> 3. Intrinsic: judging things by their own unique characteristics.
> Because it precedes putting things into concepts and systems, it is often
> a "felt" rather than "thought" judgement. For example, I love my wife for
> what she uniquely is, not because I have reasoned that she is a *good*
> (extrinsic) or *acceptable* (systemic) person.
>
> Note, these are called "dimensions" for good reason: a thing can be
> simultanensously "valued" in all three dimensions.
>
>
> Fred Reed
> freed@cc.atinc.com
>
Steve Wehrenberg