Carrier battles make for interesting campaigns as they were carried out by limited forces (those aboard ship) at a set of limited targets (an island or an opposing task force), unhindered and unaided by units outside the scope of the campaign - especially across the trackless expanses of the Pacific. More importantly, these battles changed the way nations designed their navies. The largest naval battles of World War 2 were fought with the opposing fleets never sighting on another.
The carrier developed from what was seen as a supporting unit by naval theorists in the 1920s and 1930s (portable air-cover against annoying enemy scouts) to the main striking arm of a bluewater navy. The battleship, in development for more than three centuries to stand in a battleline, the centerpiece for nearly very navy in the world, was eclipsed as the definitive unit of naval weaponry. Aircraft could outrange its guns rather handily, and dive bombs and torpedoes could be more decisive than cannon-fire.
Some of the major Pacific World War II carrier battles include:
Later in the War, (44-45) as the US navy accumulated aircraft and carriers, it was able to use carrier-based aircraft in masses of several hundred. Those numbers made up for the lack of heavy and medium bombers - but then, the USN aircraft were used against targets lighter than heavy industrial areas or massive fortresses. 500 and 1000 lb. bombs and torpedoes did just as well against log bunkers, airfields with open revetments, and warships.
In February and March, 1945, Vice Admiral Mitscher even took a large task force centered on 8 fleet carriers on to within 100 miles of Japan and directly raided the Japanese mainland.
The Battle of the Coral Sea is the first major sea battle where the main combatants never caught sight of each other. Basically, the Japanese sent an invasion fleet through the Solomon Sea, with the aim of rounding Milne Bay and taking Port Moresby by amphibious assault. It beat trying to fight over the 14,000 ft Owen Stanley Mountains! Their southern (ocean) flank was guarded by two fleet aircraft carriers (the twins Shokaku and Zuikaku) and the light carrier Shoho.
Moving into the area from the south were a task force of 2 US carriers, USS Lexington and USS Yorktown.
The Japanese wanted to seize Port Moresby, the last Allied major bastion on New Guinea. It would end their highly successful campaign of securing the Philippines, the East Indies, and Southeast Asia. They decided to send an invasion fleet by sea, since New Guinea was more or less trackless to move across. They sent a supporting force of aircraft carriers to defend them, and hoped to lure out some of the US carriers roumored to be in the area.
Carrier Div 3 | IJN Shokaku | 27 A6M2 Zero fighters 27 B5N2 Kate attack bombers 18 D3A1 Val dive bombers |
IJN Zuikaku | 27 A6M2 Zero fighters 27 B5N2 Kate attack bombers 18 D3A1 Val dive bombers |
|
IJN Shoho | 16 A6M2 Zero fighters 9 B5N2 Kate attack bombers |
|
Shore-based | Rabaul Lae |
TF | USS Lexington | F4F-4 Wildcat fighters TDB Devastator torpedo bombers SBD-3 dive bombers |
USS Yorktown | F4F-4 Wildcat fighters TDB Devastator torpedo bombers SBD-3 dive bombers |
|
Shore based | Port Moresby Townsville |
P-40 fighters B-25 medium bombers B-26 medium bombers B17E heavy bombers |
The USS Lexington was sunk and USS Yorktown damaged. The Yorktown made its way back to Pearl Harbor and performed a miracle of repair to be ready for its next major combat - the Battle of Midway. The USN aircrews did not suffer as much as their Japanese counterparts, and their experiences were passed along to other active pilots and backto US training centers.
The light carrier Shoho was sunk. The Shokaku was damaged, and returned to Japan for repairs with its division mate Zuikaku. The division was not finished replacing its air units or finished repairs in time for the Battle of Midway, where their presence could have tipped the balance in Japanese favor.
With the covering carriers withdrawn, the convoy reversed course and returned to Truk. Port Moresby was repreived and the Japanese advance across the Pacific was checked.
Clearly this is the mother of all carrier battles. Midway was:
The Japanese planned to seize Midway Island in the Central Pacific - the last US installation remaining before Hawaii. The main purpose of the invasion was to lure out the American aircraft carriers and then to smash them with his massed carriers. Admiral Yamamoto saw this as his opportunity for a decisive battle to end the war.
In addition to this attack, Yamamoto sent forces to raid US bases in the aleitians and to seize a few islands in the Aleutian chain to distract US attention and to make them divide their forces. This aspect of the plan did not work - except to seize Attu and Kiska, and to use the latter as a radar post. See the Aleutian campaign for details.
Thanks to its ability to decode Japanese radio traffic, the US was well aware of Japanese intentions and general movements. It was forced to join into battle because it could not afford to lose the Midway installations. But they did have precise information about the timing and direction of the Japanese attack. They planned to put their carriers NE of Midway (rather than on their expected direct approach of SE) before the Japanese arrived.
The outcome of the Battle of Midway is a decidive American victory:
The battle had not been completely one-sided. The US suffered its loses, too: USS Yorktown
This was the fnal check on the Japanese advance to the east, and almost the last strategic offensive they undertook.
The Battle of the Eastern Solomons of 24/25-Aug-42 pitted two near-equal Japanese and US carrier groups against each other. As its name implies, they tangled in the Eastern Solomons within 200 miles east of Guadalcanal. The battle of the Eastern Solomons is tied to the Guadalcanal campaign in several ways:
The Japanese goal was to escort a troop and supply convoy to retake Guadalcanal. The Japanese were aware of the presence of US carriers in the area, and hoped to nail one to help even up the odds after Midway.
Ryujo was sunk. USS Enterprise was damaged. The Japanese troop convoy turned back.
The Battle of the the Santa Cruz Islands was one of the few carrier battles where both sides knew there would be a carrier battle. Both sides had maneuvered carriers into the area to fight the enemy's carriers. This clash was an out-growth of the Guadalcanal campaign. In this case, the air units at Henderson Field and Rabaul had no effect on the battle.
The Japanese naval units were engaged in a complex movement involved in covering the movement of a troop convoy to Guadalcanal. After the loss of 3 of 6 troop transports a month earlier and a need to take the US position and airfield on Guadalcanal, the Japanese had three major task forces east of the troop convoy: Kukuta's Support force (2 BBs, 3 CAs, and Junyo), Nagumo's Striking Force (Kido Butai: CVs Shokaku, Zuikaku, and CVL Zuiho), and Abe's Vanguard force (2BBs, 3 CAs). Abe was to operate 60-100 miles ahead of Nagumo, partly as seekers and partly as bait for the US carriers who were thought to be drawn into the waters east of the Santa Cruz Islands by the lure of the troops convoy and by covering US reinforcements (that must come lest Guadalcanal fall).
The Americans knew that some carriers were in the area to support the Japanese offensive. They planned to attack the CVs while they were covering the Japanese invasion forces (they expected the Japanese would try to land at Lunga, within the US perimeter). They expected only the two light carriers.
I think this includes one of the most exciting four hour periods of carrier warfare on record.
USS Hornet was sunk (eventually). Zuiho and Zuikaku were damaged. The IJN lost half of its the carrier aircraft involved - including many crews.
By late 1943, the Japanese Naval high command could see writing on the wall. The US military forces were rapidly increasing in quality and quantity, and if their pilot quality was not necessarily increasing, the quality of IJN and JAAF flyers was rapidly decreasing. They could see from the American seizures of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands that the crucial target would be the Marianas. Seizing the Marianas would:
If they Americans were coming, the Japanese could be ready and strike at them as the Americans had at Midway....
The Japanese goal was to lure enough of US carriers into a known position and sink them in a Midway-like final confrontation. Plans centered around the 1st Koku Kentai (Air Fleet) based in the Marianas and Formosa and Admiral Ozawa's fleet in the Sulu Sea with 3 fleet carriers, 6 smaller carriers, and the giant battleships Yamato and Musashi.
Unit | Vessels | Aircraft |
1st Carrier Division 601st Air Corps |
CV Taiho CV Shokaku CV Zuikaku |
81 A6M5 Zeros 9 D4Y recon 81 D4Y divebombers 54 B6N2 bombers |
2nd Carrier Division 652nd Air Corps |
CVL Junyo CVL Hiyo CVL Ryuho |
81 A6M5 Zeros 9 D4Y divebombers 27 D3A divebombers 27 B6N2 bombers |
3rd Carrier Division 653rd Air Corps |
CVE Chiyoda CVE Chitose CVE Zuiho |
63 A6M5 Zeros 6 D4Y divebombers 12 B5N2 bombers |
* - The Japanese Army was not convinceed by the Japanese Navy's prediction of either a big battle or dire consiequences and declined to ship additional units to the Marianas.
13-Jun-44 | US carrier planes begin bombardment of Marianas bases. Admiral Ozawa prepares to move from his anchorage in Tawitawi, but is delayed to refuel. |
13-Jun-44 to 18-Jun-44 |
1st Air Fleet heavily damaged by combat and attacks against its bases. By the end, its remnants are hardly air-worthy. Attacks from Iwo Jima are also been beaten back by an impenetrable shield of F6F Hellcats. |
19-Jun-44 | Carrier vs Carrier combat starts. The Japanese find themselves at a great disadvantage in both experience and technology. They lose many aircraft for very little gain. CVs Taiho and Shokaku are destroyed by submarine attack. |
20-Jun-44 | As Ozawa's aircraft were being readied for a morning all-out attack, the Japanese are struck by a massive American attack.
A night attack with 10 torpedo bombers does not work. The surviving Japanese depart the area, carrying only 25 Zeros, 6 torpedo bombers, and 2 dive bombers. |
After this, the Japanese did not have enough carrier-trained crew to fill its surviving carriers. The carriers never put to sea as fighting units again. The USN landed and took the Marianas, and just as the Japanese predicted, began adapting its air bases for use by B-29 bombers.
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