Jack's response to my example of my hand being mechanistic while "I"
am not and saying this is dualistic is, I think, not accurate. Isn't
it an act of dualism to propose that either they are all the same or
they are separate. Quantum physics and Eastern philosophies (to name
two areas) tells us that it's more like "and/both".
But let's see if we can clarify. I think it will be important if we
are to retain the usefulness of the material, systems thinking while
introducing living phenomena thinking.
First, I use systems in the sense the W. Gibbs defined many years
ago. That is, a system is a mental construct which is isolated as a
single entity of various relationships and considered as a whole FOR
SPECIFIC PURPOSES. These "systems" are therefor totally linguistic
and created, they may include other systems and be part of larger
systems, and they may be part of one system in one perspective and
another system in another perspective.
That is, I don't think a "hand as a mechanical system" is anything
other than a construct which is useful when we want to consider the
relationships of nerves, muscles, blood circulation, etc and their
creation of movement.
If we are interested in what makes a hand move or how a hand
maintains itself as a living system, this mechanistic view - and what
we include in our description - will have to change dramatically.
I said,
> >*Note: control doesn't apply to living systems AS LIVING SYSTEMS.
What the above is attempting to say is that we can consider a hand as
a mechanical (and therefor non-living) system and think about
control. When we consider it as a living system - that is, as Jack
says "I" and "my hand" are not different parts or separate - the idea
of control will not be valid.
Jack says,
> This relies on the dualistic myth that "I" and "my hand" are two different
> entities.
No. The way I've used it implies only that we can distinguish in
thought between "I" and "my hand" in many ways. Some will be more
useful than others at various times.
Jack also says that I'm saying,
> If one chooses to think of the hand as a physical, material system,
> then "I" can act on it.
I did not say nor imply this either. It is one way that thinking
could occur but is not implied as valid or useful in my statements.
What is implied in my statements is that one can consider the
operations of a hand distinct from the "I" of which it is a part.
Stepping into the slightly dangerous ground of example again, I think
that if the bones of my hand are broken and it doesn't function
anymore, I want a doctor who understands the physical mechanics of
how hands work to operate on it.
I consider Jack's example of typing a message to be an act of the
whole is consistent with my view of being and of my view of "hand" in
the process. That is, the mechanics of the hand are largely
irrelevent to the process. Just as the mechanics of the typing
machine are.
However, Jack, is it logically consistent to say "it is an action
that engages signals and feedback in continuous loops between my
hands and my brain"? Isn't this simply a more detailed and equally
mechanistic and subject/object approach than the original hand
example I used? It seems so to me.
--
Michael McMaster : Michael@kbdworld.com
book cafe site : http://www.vision-nest.com/BTBookCafe
"I don't give a fig for the simplicity this side of complexity
but I'd die for the simplicity on the other side of complexity."
attributed to Chief Justice Brandies
Learning-org -- An Internet Dialog on Learning Organizations
For info: <rkarash@karash.com> -or- <http://world.std.com/~lo/>