in which Michal McMaster says (in part, about IBM's responses)...
>> They failed to investigate new routs, new
>> possibilities, even though the market was screaming those possibilities
>> out!
> The market was hardly "screaming" at early enough stages. Changes
> happen at the fringes and don't become obvious until it's too late
> for competitive advantage. They were "screaming" only in hindsight
> or in your head. (That's to acknowledge that some see what's coming
> early and it seems to be screaming to them ..... but they are usually
> equally ineffective in being heard in the marketplace.)
> "Screaming" is, I think, a relative term. When you are outside, or
> well-connected the new or small, then a signal strength need not be
> very large to be loud. When you're large and have rigid or thick
> sensory apparatus and are inside, a very large signal is required
> even to be heard.
As one of the players in that period, I'd like to offer the per-
spective that you're guessing, Michael. In fact, from inside the
experience (as a consultant to various parts of IBM, about the
microprocessor revolution, and PCs in particular), I can assure you
that the "screaming" was loud and clear, at the center (particularly
in Armonk). But, because they were swayed principally by the $$$'s
at stake in the mainframe business, a vast amount of executive effort
went into corrupting the raw market data, denying its relevance,
and seeking corroboration from their existing, large, mainframe
customers. Those customers, who'd built their careers on mainframes
and dumb terminals perceived the PC as an irritation, and hopefully
a minor one. Those customers (in the mid-80s) didn't want to become
obsolete in their own time. Had IBM truly listened BEYOND their own
customer's mindset, they would have heard the "screaming" in the
marketplace. Just look at the tremendous growth in PCs, IBM's eroding
PC share, and the emergence of Novell in that time-frame. It took a
*massive* amount of effort--having *heard* the "screaming"--to deny
its existance...
...Which you alluded to earlier in your post when you said, "IBM
wasn't even listening to its customers. IBM, as an organisation,
was listening to itself." ... Or, at least, talking to itself.
I don't know how many meetings I attended in that period at which
I saw young, bright people shouting "The Emperor's wearing NO
clothes..." and watched their careers self-destruct before my eyes.
And the early departures from IBM into Amdahl took many of those
habits along. As recently as two years ago in conversations
with Amdahl executives they were effectively denying that PCs were
a significant force eroding their marketplace ('tho that appears
to be changing now).
At core, I agree with your "encourage the periphery" concept.
But in the hallowed halls of Mahogany Row where the principal
business for many company's executives is to assure each other
that "You're OK; I'm OK", that concept falls on deaf ears. Un-
fortunately, IBM fit that description in the mid-80s to early-90s.
--
Carol Anne Ogdin "Great minds discuss ideas,
Deep Woods Technology average minds discuss events,
CAOgdin@deepwoods.com small minds discuss people."
--Adm. Hyman G. Rickover